

Marxism and *The End of History and the Last Man*: A Critical Review

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Abstract

This review of *The End of History and the Last Man* sets out to achieve two major objectives: first, to establish whether or not the collapse of the Soviet state system and the alleged triumph as well as reconsolidation of liberal democracy have finally sounded the death knell of Marxism as a body of thought and a guide to action. The paper tries to achieve this objective by examining some of the core concepts of Marxism - e.g., alienation and exploitation; inequality and freedom; the question of the state; and the nature of imperialism - to see the extent to which they have been made otiose by the alleged triumph of liberal democratic system. The evidence emerging from their analyses, however, is not only the correctness and profundity of the position of Marx and his disciples - Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Hoxher, Castro, Cabral, Fanon, Mao, Machel, etc. - but that as long as Fukuyama attempts to mystify the insidiousness of the capitalist cum liberal democracy *vis-a-vis* alienation and exploitation of the worker on the one hand, and the predatoriness of imperialism over other peoples and lands on the other, so long shall the unscientific assertions and assumptions of the book continue to be subjected to critical pulverizations and attacks. Arising from this conclusion, the second and related objective is to exhort workers in both the advanced capitalist and the super-exploited Third World countries towards greater and more focused struggles to bring down the moribund capitalist system, which is to be replaced with socialism/communism.

Introduction

Francis Fukuyama's book¹ definitely registered acceptance, going by the number of favourable reviews that it received since publication in 1992. As a

sample, two of the reviewers, as shown on the back cover of the book, argue, among others, that the work “[a]rms Western political thought with new fundamental theoretical arguments to reinforce its practical actions” (Eduard Shevardnadze) and that “[I]n the mastery and scope of its case, *The End of History and the Last Man* may be seen as the first book of the post-Marxist millennium - the first work fully to fathom the depth and range of the changes now sweeping through the world” (George Gilder in the *Washington Post* (n.d.)

That the former quotation is from Eduard Shevardnadze, a renegade Marxist and one of the liquidators of the first socialist states in the world, should not come as a surprise. What should really bother a Marxist, who is convinced of the correctness and genuineness of the Marxist thought, is the aspect of his quoted adulation which seeks to imply that the work has so fundamentally armed western world-view with arguments of immense theoretical importance to reinforce its practical actions. If one may ask: What are the practical actions of the West, both historically and in contemporary perspectives, which he is referring to? To us, if we may hazard an answer to the question, these do not differ fundamentally from the horrendous atrocities of imperialism that Lenin and other Marxists have written and talked about and/or for which others (nation-states and peoples) have had to pay immeasurable price.

It is rather sad that in the fullness of time many of the proponents of and believers in the West’s ‘practical actions’ shall be unable to witness let alone assess the full impact of the debacles to be unleashed on the ‘new’ nations of eastern Europe - particularly Shevardnadze’s Georgia - with the penetration of imperialist capital into them.

As for the latter quoted review, it is just pertinent to recall what Marx and Engels said in the Preamble to the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*:

A spectre is haunting Europe - the spectre of Communism. All the Powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: Pope and Czar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police-spies.

Where is the party in opposition that has not been decried as Communistic by its opponents in power? Where is the Opposition that has not hurled back the branding reproach of Communism, against the more advanced opposition parties, as well as against its reactionary adversaries?²

The import of what this particular reviewer, George Gilder, has said about Fukuyama’s book indicates that the allegory of a Europe haunted by a spectre used by Marx and Engels over 150 years ago is still apt in our period. This is nowhere shown than in the uncritical acceptance of the content of the book

which came on the heels, or as a simultaneous celebration, of the culminated crises that rocked the various socialist states in Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the world. In other words, with the collapse of the Soviet-type state in Europe, contemporary imperialism is the much happier as a spectre of a monumentally historical (and even symbolic) importance is now considered to have been overcome. How far from the truth could this assumption be? In the first instance, the collapse of that state system is not the same thing as the collapse of Marxism as a philosophy, a world-view and a guide to action. This is regardless of the ideological and material affinity that existed, or that could still exist, between the ideology and the resultant state system. All the same, the collapse of the Soviet-type state system does not have the same import as and cannot be conflated with the demise of Marxism. The basic principles of Marxism - dialectics and materialism - are very much alive (as this paper will show), even if they too may be affected by one crisis or the other. As long as the bourgeois state is still undergirded by the capitalist political economy! which *The End of History and the Last Man* claps and has come to advocate and justify, so long will Marxism be relevant. Secondly, and in relation to the foregoing point, there is the general problem of the book, shared by the reviewers, that has turned the exercise of writing 'Universal History' in the Hegelian sense into an undisguised, unrelenting and hackneyed preoccupation of denigrating Marxism and communism. Thus, to talk, for instance, of the 'post-Marxist millennium' is simply to translate the collapse of the system¹ state type-only in Eastern Europe, mark you into both temporal and spatial transcendentalism. The basic epistemological question such a position raises is to what extent or at what point in time and in which place - may be in a liberal democratic location - can a body of thought, particularly a world-view, be said to be *completely* effete? On the other hand, can it not be argued that, despite Marxism, the ideas of Hegel have survived to the extent that Fukuyama, among others, would be at pains to juxtapose them with one another, with a view 'proving comparatively the superiority of Hegelianism over Marxism, at least Thirdly, Fukuyama's book does not have a scientific aura to it to warrant the adulations heaped on it already, and, more so, in the future. This is because a book that was written three or four years after the major events in Eastern Europe had occurred should rather be seen for what it is: a justificatory enterprise rather than an explanatory, predictive, or analytic preoccupation, is neither telling the world the circumstances that led to the collapse of the communist state system (except in a superficial and perfunctory manner), nor whether or not the 'triumph' of liberalism *has finally and actually* sounded the death knell of Marxism - as an idea, a philosophy and a revolutionary guide to action.

In this paper, the main objective is to make a critical review of Fukuyama's work by juxtaposing it with the essential ideas of Marx, Engels

and Lenin, which may have been unfairly attacked and/or misrepresented. It must be stressed that the critique of Fukuyama is not being done because such Marxist ideas are attacked *per se*, but because, in spite of the attack, they are still relevant to the contemporary world in which contradictions and cut-throat competition - rather than consensus, and solidarity - still determine relations among antagonistic social forces, nation-states, etc. The following shall constitute the themes around which the rest of the paper is organized: alienation/exploitation; inequality/freedom; the question of the state; and the nature of imperialism.

Alienation and Exploitation

In Marxism, alienation and exploitation are central to its discourse and, more so, to *its praxis*, i.e., what is to be done to bring about de-alienation of man and the excessive nature of his exploitation in the capitalist epoch. As Marxist concepts, they can only be properly understood if placed in the context of production and production relations. They also have to be understood in their historical development. Alienation, in particular, has to be seen as the outcome of the influence of the factory technology, the increasing division of labour that the capitalist system has heightened, as well as the capitalist property institutions and the other social institutions (created by capitalist man) which in turn have made man to lose his freedom, total skills and creativity. In its simplest formulation, alienation is self-alienation and it is total:

A direct consequence of the alienation of man from the product of his labour, from his life activity and from his species life is' that *man* is *alienated* from other *man* ... In general, the statement that man is alienated from his species life means that each man is alienated from others and that each of the others is likewise alienated from human life... Every self-alienation of man, from himself and from nature, appears in the relation which he postulates between other men and himself and nature.' (Emphasis in the original.)

As already indicated, the clearest expression of this alienation is found in the capitalist social order where the bourgeoisie and the proletariat stand face to face with one another or are in the market where they meet to exchange, as far as bourgeois legal mythology would have it. equivalents, i.e., the bourgeoisie providing wages for the labour-power of the proletariat. What each party provides is considered a property and it is understood to be exchanged at will: nobody is worse off and nobody is cheated or exploited. From Marx's ideas, as quoted above and also from this explanation, the bourgeoisie is suffering from and experiences alienation also: but it is the alienation of the worker that is

more pernicious and more degrading, as it leads to another form of bourgeois social reality: exploitation in the process of production.

Before we go further to discuss how exploitation takes place in the production realm (the ultimate in alienation), it is instructive to follow Marx's argument from the sphere of circulation to the culmination of the phenomenon, especially how it gets codified in the bourgeois legal form and content:

In order that these objects may enter into relations with each other as commodities, their guardians must place themselves in relation to one another, as persons whose will resides in these objects, and must behave in such a way that each does not appropriate the commodity of the other, and part with his own, except by means of an act done by mutual consent. They must therefore, mutually recognize in each other the rights of private property. This juridical relation, which this expresses itself in a contract, whether such contract be part of a developed legal system or not, is a relation between two wills, and is but the reflex of the real economic relation between the two.⁴

Marx also continued:

The sphere [of circulation or commodity exchange], within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour-power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. It is the exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity, let us say labour-power, are determined only by their own free will. They contract as free persons, who are equal before the law ...Equality, because each enters into relations with the other, as with a simple owner of commodities, and they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property, because each disposes only what is his own. And Bentham, because each looks only to his own advantage. The only force bringing them together is the selfishness, and the gain and the private interest of each.⁵

And finally, the result of the exchange is captured thus:

He, who before was the money-owner now strides out as a capitalist; the possessor of labour-power follows as his labourer. The one with an air of importance, smirking, intent on business; the other, timid and holding back, like one who is bringing his own hide to market and has nothing to expect but - a hiding.⁶

Exploitation in the sphere of capitalist production is, therefore, the reification of alienation of the proletariat. As generally acknowledged (whether one is a bourgeois or a Marxist scholar), production is the essence of man. Man has to

produce, to exploit nature in order to satisfy his multitude of wants: food, shelter, clothing and even reproduction. With the advent of commodity production, with increasing production of exchange-value rather than use-value, and with the commodification of labour-power, the value of labour-power has to be determined -just as the value of any commodity would be. For Marx, it is only labour that creates value; and the process of creating value is determined by the labour-time required for its production:

The value of labour-power is determined, as in the case of every other commodity, by the labour-time necessary for the production, and consequently also the reproduction, of the special article. So far as it has value, it represents no more than a definite quantity of the average labour of society incorporated in it.⁷

And since the value of labour-power is determined by the value of the necessities required to produce, develop and maintain the worker,

...the labour's working day consists of two parts, 'necessary labour time,' during which he creates value equal to the value of commodities he gets from the capitalist as wages, and 'surplus labour time,' in which the worker creates surplus value. The appropriation of this surplus value by the capitalist constitutes exploitation.⁸

Since this general principle of capitalism was elaborated in *Das Capital* or even before then, this has been its essence. The capitalist, in other words, cannot remain an hour longer in business without the appropriation of the surplus value created by the worker. He necessarily and increasingly has to earn profit, and, through it, to expand his capital. For Marx, Engels and their followers, this state of affairs, much as it is not strictly viewed as a moral issue (even though it is not bad to conceptualize and conscientize human existence in its moral undertones, to at least serve the purpose of mobilization and struggle), should not be allowed to continue. Workers are thus enjoined to struggle against the system of wage slavery, to end it and consequently to build a new society in which men would truly be liberated and become equal with one another.

What is Fukuyama's 'reply' to this, since his work is considered to belong in the genre of 'Universal History?' For a book of alleged monumental importance, there is not a single mention of the word 'exploitation.' Where he discusses 'alienation,' he merely regurgitates Hegel in the latter's assertion that history ended in 1806 with the triumph of the liberal state.⁹ (If Hegel has originally said that 'history ended in 1806', what then, one would like to ask, is new in Fukuyama's work to warrant its unprecedented adulation? The only thing new, if one may hazard a guess, is the instrumental use of the book for an

ideological spanking of Marxism). Hence, to prove a point that is hardly there, he supports himself with the hackneyed argument by Alexandre Kojève, the French-Russian philosopher that was, according to Fukuyama, the greatest interpreter of Hegel in the twentieth century, just as Marx was considered to be Hegel's greatest interpreter in the nineteenth century.¹⁰ Perhaps, we can better appreciate the limitation of Fukuyama's thought as it is based on Kojève and Hegel, by also liberally quoting the former, as he has done in *The End of History and the Last Man*:

Observing what was taking place around me, and reflecting on what had taken place in the world since the Battle of Jena, I understood that Hegel was right to see in the battle the end of History properly so-called. In and by this battle the vanguard of humanity virtually attained the limit and the aim, that is, the end, of Man's historical evolution. What has happened since then was but an extension in space of the universal revolutionary force actualized in France by Robespierre-Napoleon. From the authentically historical point of view, the two world wars with their retinue of large and small revolutions had only the effect of bringing the backward civilizations of the peripheral provinces into line with the most advanced (real or virtual) European historical positions. If the Sovietization of Russia and the Communization of China are anything more than or different from the democratization of imperial Germany (by way of Hitlerism) or the accession of Togoland to independence, nay, the self-determination of the Papuans, it is only because the Sino-Soviet actualization of Robespierrian Bonapartism obliges post-Napoleonic Europe to speed up the elimination of the numerous more or less anachronistic sequels to its pre-revolutionary past.¹¹

The quotation easily shows how indeed it is possible to prove that a "clown may be a 'maker of history.'" ¹² As a matter of fact, a better interpretation would have to agree with Bertrand Russell that Hegel was actually not a crusader for nor did he have a better appreciation of the liberal state. As he actually puts it Hegel's metaphysics (which Fukuyama and his ilk would regard to be 'Universal History') connotes that:

...true liberty consists in obedience to an arbitrary authority, that free speech is an evil, that absolute monarchy is good, that the Prussian state was the best existing at the time he wrote, that war is good, and that an international organization for the peaceful settlement of disputes would be a misfortune.¹³

Having read Russell as per the quotation above, Kojève, Fukuyama and their ideological bedfellows would have to be seriously criticized for thinking that

the two world wars had the catalytic effect of bringing backward nations to the 'high cultural and civilizational levels' of the European state system, nay the liberal democratic state. If anything, the two world wars of the 20th century plus the small, localized conflicts which have largely been fought outside Europe, North America, Japan and 'Down Under' have shown (i) the rapaciousness of the Euro-American and Japanese 'civilizational system,' i.e., capitalism, and (ii) the myopic, racist and ethnocentric bias of the so-called 'Universal History' handed down to mankind *a la* Hegel. Furthermore, bourgeois historicism, as may have been articulated and justified in concepts such as liberal democracy, modernization, free enterprise economy and, lately, globalization' has had its ideological veil thoroughly torn into shreds through the works of classical Marxists and the so-called neo-Marxists.¹⁴ The many contradictions of this mode and its state form have hardly been resolved in spite of, one must admit this point, the many material, technological and ideological advances made by the capitalist system since Marx and Engels, in particular, lived and wrote their works. Thus, it is a historical fallacy to latch on to one historic, in Marxist terminology, conjunctural, factor - the Battle of Jena - as the signal point in the end of history - i.e., the ascendance of liberal democratic state. Liberal democracy, either before or since then, is a process which has never remained static nor retained its pristine form. In particular, the many revolutionary struggles of the workers and even the competition of the capitalists, both nationally and internationally, have led to its transformations. Besides, it is intellectually dishonest, naïve and selectively biased (even when one wants to make an ideological point) not to underscore the economic foundations of (i.e. the influence of the emergence of capitalism on) the liberal democratic state.

Perhaps the more ominous observation that one came out with from the quotation of Kojève above is his interpretation of the historical significance of the two world wars. Indeed, it is both appalling and a matter for deep regret that one who is held up to have deepened Hegel's thought and who is hailed as the perfecter and synthesizer of liberal democratic thought would, in turn, unabashedly hail the ravages of the two world wars and see them as bringing civilization to backward regions of the world, such as Africa. If the two world wars had actually brought civilization to the peoples of the Third World, we should be inclined, in a manner of enlightened self-interest, to ask for more global wars or be allowed to witness, particularly the Third World War, as it would yet bring the 'benighted' Africans closer to this 'fantastic' civilization of the West. Much as we do not want to experience another war of the magnitude that our fathers or forefathers were dragged into against their will, Western imperialism cannot afford it either. This is principally because of its inability to obtain (on similar conditions that existed during colonial hegemonization) the war's cannon fodder the dependent peoples that could fight it.¹⁵

Consequently, *The End of History and the Last Man* should be seen and received like its pedigree or genre— Rostow's *Stages of Economic Growth*¹⁶ -as bourgeois ideology, pure and simple. It is hardly going to amount to much after the initial ovation that greeted it had been drowned by a more correct interpretation of the history of mankind.

Inequality and Freedom

Marxism is perhaps the greatest partisan modern secular ideology against, on the one hand, inequality, and, on the other, for freedom. To appreciate the basis for the concern of Marxism in these twin endeavours, one should put the issues in their dialectical and historical perspectives. Inequality, like under-development, is not an original or a natural state - to borrow the language of *dependentista* theorists. It came into being at a definite point in the historical development of man. In the Marxian discourse, this arose with the advent of private property and classes. The consequent emergence of inequality of man is the basis, also, of the lack of freedom among men in class societies. Since inequality is not natural but historical, Marx and Engels postulated that inequality can be abolished and mankind can regain not only its lost freedom but also put an end to class differences. This would have to be brought about through the capture of state power by the proletariat - the most revolutionary class in history. This class would, with power in its hand, institute its dictatorship as a transitional phase to the eventual and the ultimate abolition of state, private property, class distinctions and other privileges. It is in the future communist society that equality and freedom of man could be restored, the alienation of man and the monstrous division of labour so characteristic of capitalism would all come to an end, too. This is when the aphorism 'the end of history' can really be problematized,¹⁷

Fukuyama and other liberal theorists would start the critique of this Marxist position by resorting to crude empiricist argument. That is, they would argue that, before the collapse of the East European state system, hardly was class division or social stratification diminishing to the extent that mankind could be adjudged to be at the threshold of the end of history - whence freedom would be reclaimed. In addition, it is a general argument in bourgeois social science that the former states in Eastern Europe were dictatorships of the worst bureaucratic type, totally dominating and circumscribing the freedom of their citizens. Ready examples to cite for elucidation purposes would include the aberrations of Nicolae Ceaucescu, Erich Honecker, Pol Pot, the Tiananmen Square episode, etc.

While some of the excesses of these regimes could not be defended, even on account of the truest and purest exercise of the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the fact would still have to be stressed that the

erstwhile states in Eastern Europe, in Asia and in Cuba (where they may currently be found) were and still are not communist states. (The conceptual difference between the two is usually glossed over in Western literature and the ‘ popular press.) As socialist states, they were and still are transitional states. Indeed, the unmaking of these states came about as a result of certain rigidities and dogmatism, which did not in one respect advance Marxist thought or practice. In historic terms, the erstwhile states in Eastern Europe advanced the productive forces; these should have been followed by making advances possible in cultural spheres, such as the removal of pre-revolutionary fetters on a remarkably literate and enlightened society. In addition, there should have been truly the irrevocable and irrefutable laying of the solid foundations for the development of the communist millennia by consolidating on the advances in the two realms. It was the contradiction between these two spheres plus, of course, the role of imperialism (which we shall come to discussing shortly) that culminated in the as yet unexplained events of the late eighties in Eastern Europe.

Apart from the well-deserved attack on the practice of issues such as equality and freedom in the extinct or extant socialist states, how perfect is the practice of these issues in liberal democracies, especially in the extent to which their observance could be considered to have fared better? Before answering this question, it is important to note that Fukuyama conceives of and traces Jjie pervasiveness and entrenchment of inequality in the liberal democratic societies to two categories of social inequalities: the one that is traceable to human convention, and the other that is attributable to nature or natural necessity.¹⁸ Could there be remedial measures to take care of the problems of inequality in this type of society? According to Fukuyama:

All truly liberal societies are in principle dedicated to the elimination of conventional sources of inequality. In addition, the dynamism of capitalist economies tends to break down many conventional and cultural barriers to equality through its continually changing demand for labor...Capitalism is a dynamic force which constantly attacks purely conventional social relationships, replacing inherited privilege with new stratification based on skill and education. Without universal literacy and education, without a high degree of social mobility and occupations open to talent rather than privilege, capitalist societies would not work, or would not work as efficiently as they could. In addition, virtually all modern democracies regulate business, redistribute income from the rich to the poor, and have accepted some degree of responsibility for social welfare, from Social Security and Medicare in the United States to the more comprehensive welfare systems of Germany or Sweden.¹⁹

From the foregoing, it should be clear that in liberal democracies inequality is perceived and accepted as natural, immutable (cannot be eliminated) and, more seriously, essential if the 'end of history' is to continue. Reformism, from Fukuyama's analysis above, inevitably follows; whereas what is required, as argued earlier, is a revolutionary change; an attack on both the substantive embodiment and residues that are capable of continuing an inequitable social system.

It is not that substantive freedoms like those circumscribed by want generally, i.e. hunger, housing problems, poverty and social cum racial inequities such as discrimination, especially for blacks in his native U.S.A., are not unknown to Fukuyama, but, as arguments and historical experiences have shown, they are the natural concomitants of capitalism and nothing drastic, could be done except to blunt their sharp edges through reforms. Bourgeois formal freedom is what is, therefore, highly celebrated in *The End of History and the Last Man*. In spite of the giant strides in productivity that is justifiably associated with mature capitalism, man in a liberal state is, however, still haunted by wants and can, therefore, be considered to be still trapped in the 'realm of necessity' rather than liberated and humanized in the 'realm of freedom.'

The Question of the State

In some of the previous themes, the Marxist position on the state has largely been restated. It may, therefore, need no repetition here. Rather, one should go straight to take up Fukuyama on two issues: the moral superiority of the liberal democratic state over the Marxist state; and why, in spite of it, it has not been universalized. To him and indeed the early liberal theorists like Hobbes and Locke:

The founding of a liberal democracy is meant to be a supremely rational political act, in which the community as a whole deliberates on the nature of the constitution and [the] set of basic laws that will govern its public life.²⁰

And it is widely and positively appraised because:

... there appears to be a general consensus that... (liberal democracy) is the most rational form of government, that is, the state that realizes most fully either rational desire or rational recognition.²¹

Why then has it not achieved universalization?

The reason why liberal democracy has not become universal, or 'remained stable once it has achieved power, lies ultimately in the

incomplete correspondence between peoples and states. States are purposeful political creations, while peoples are pre-existing moral communities. That is, peoples are communities with common beliefs about good and evil, about the nature of the sacred and the profane, which may have arisen from a deliberate founding in the distant past but which now exists largely as a matter of transition...The realm of states is the realm of the political, the sphere of self-conscious choice about the proper mode of governance. The realm of peoples is sub-political: it is the domain of culture and society, whose rules are seldom explicit or self-consciously recognized even by those who participate in them...²²

The problem with this formulation is the impression created that liberal democracy (or state) is the only rational choice that citizens of even the advanced capitalist countries have come to accept; and that, at regular intervals, they come out to reaffirm their pledge of loyalty to it. May be periodic elections can be used to arrive at such a conclusion. But it fails to show the proportion of registered voters to those who actually vote from one election to another. If the observed trend is a decline in voter turn-out (only occasionally do voter turn-outs of successive elections supercede those in the preceding elections), questions are never fundamentally asked about circumstances occasioning the decline. The point being made is as follows: loyalty to the liberal democratic state is never absolute; from time to time opposition, both open and subtle, is normally manifested against the bourgeois Leviathanism.

Besides, outside the institutional mechanisms for the practice of liberal democracy - political parties, parliament, bureaucracy, etc., what options are available to conscientious objectors to liberal democracy? How is conformity ensured or, still saying the same thing in other words, how do the particular structures available influence patterns of participation? Or has he so soon forgotten the monstrous absurdities of McCarthyism in America? The liberal democratic state may, in contemporary conjuncture, appear to be truly liberal and *laissez faire*; this is but one side of its nature, which is associated with boom. When the boom bursts, it is then that mankind shall witness the more ferocious ugly side of the capitalist system. This was witnessed in the late 1920s and early 1930s, which culminated into the second World War.

One would like to say that while the admittance of the lack of correspondence between people and state that is apparently behind the non-universalization of liberal democracy is correct, it woefully fails to equally accept that the liberal state, like all state systems, is a historical project or creation. Notwithstanding Fukuyama's reaffirmation of Hobbes and Locke above and the extent of its comparative functionality in the contemporary conjuncture, it is not supposed to constitute 'the end of history.' Indeed, given the weakness inherent in the liberal democratic state, engendered most

forcefully by the contradictions in the mode of production undergirding it, the liberal democratic state is also a transitional project. It may appear to have 'vanquished' the Marxian state system now, resurgent Marxism (resurgent - yes - because of the dialectics in the development of ideas - wherein there are usually their high and low points of development) will not be the only anti-liberal element against the democratic state, as it has militantly been, but also other social democratic forces, especially within the liberal democratic state, will and can be.

After all, speaking dialectically now, who thought that opposition against the East European state system could be manipulated not only from within or without the states, but, most fundamentally, also from the wombs, the inner cores of the leadership of the Communist Party, *a la* Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Shevardnadze, etc.? Furthermore and in the historico-materialistic language, the correct solution to the non-universalization of liberal democracy is indeed not its universalization, but the renewed determination, in spite of the current setback of Marxism in territorial or spatial terms, to smash the bourgeoisie state : by the working class and the other allied classes. Any allowance given to this state system and with the vigour capitalism is giving to beef up imperialism, the lot of the exploited classes and nations may continue to get worsened. This is then a call on the exploited nation-states as well as workers in both the capitalist states and in the Third World to redouble efforts in the struggle for their emancipation and for genuine socialism and social progress. At this juncture, the problem of how imperialism is analyzed in Fukuyama's work is taken up, as a proper examination of its phenomenon can aid the concert of struggle that is being advocated.

The Nature of Imperialism

The nature and effect of imperialism are, especially in the era of monopoly capitalism, issues that are central to Marxism. In particular, Lenin, in his classic work,²³ differentiated between the nature of imperialism - as a world historical phenomenon - before 1870 and its nature after 1870 and came up with its features as follows: (i) the concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life; (ii) the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation, on the basis of this 'finance capital,' of a financial oligarchy; (iii) the export of capital which when distinguished from the export of commodities acquire exceptional importance; (iv) the formation of international monopolist associations which share the world among themselves; and (v) the territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is completed.²⁴

Although the colonial component of imperialism may have been overcome with the regaining of the sovereignty of the colonized territories generally; although, too, the export of capital may not be largely going to the under-developed territories but is rather circulating more intensely among the advanced capitalist countries, imperialism, as a subtle economic phenomenon of capitalism, is still rapacious, exploitative, and dehumanizing. In our era, the 'constabulary roles of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) confirm Lenin's thesis of the continued existence of a financial oligarchy.

Fukuyama recognizes the historical nature of the phenomenon of imperialism. He is equally aware of its violent nature; but the thrust of his argument is that, with the triumph of the liberal democratic state, imperialism, i.e., territorial aggrandizement, is ended, like his interpreted history. Imperialism has been rather replaced by economic competition that is mutually and/or universally beneficiary to states involved in such economic relationships. Quoting Joseph Schumpeter's thesis that "[a] purely capitalist world... can offer no fertile soil to imperialist impulses," he argues that-

Imperialism and war were historically the product of aristocratic societies. If liberal democracy [capitalism] abolished the class distinction between masters and slaves by making the slaves their own masters (sic.), then it too should eventually abolish imperialism."²⁵

And, furthermore, that:

The argument ... is not so much that liberal democracy constrains man's natural instincts' for aggression and violence, *but that it has fundamental!]* 'transformed the instincts themselves and eliminated the motive for imperialism'"¹ (Emphasis mine.)

Like Marx would use the concept of 'commodity fetishism' to describe how the capitalist would like to mask exploitation inherent in the production relations between him and the workers (see above), we can also refer to this formulation as the 'fetishism of imperialism.' In other words, it is a hackneyed notion to conclude that imperialism is antithetical to capitalism and *vice-versa*. As if this is not absurd enough, Fukuyama has gone further to argue that:

The fundamentally un-warlike character of liberal societies is evident in the extraordinarily peaceful relations they maintain among one another. There is by now a substantial body of literature noting the fact there have been few, if any, instances of one liberal democracy going to war with another. The political scientist Michael Doyle, for example,

maintains that in two hundred or so years that modern liberal democracies have existed, not one single such instance has occurred. Liberal democracies can, of course, fight states that are not liberal democracies, just as the United States fought in the two world wars, Korea, Vietnam, and most recently the Persian Gulf.²⁷

While this assertion is historically fallacious,²⁸ it is also ideologically and conceptually incorrect to argue that wars or their threats have not occurred between liberal democracies and that, therefore, imperialism has been eliminated. The distinction he is trying to make between the liberal democracies and the fascists during the First and Second World Wars is mere semantics. To a Marxist, fascism is the most monstrous outward manifestation of the capitalist system, and it comes to the fore when capitalism is buffeted by some of its numerous crises, such as unrelenting recession, stagflation, burgeoning unemployment, unsold mounting stocks, etc. It is immaterial that it irrupted in Germany and Italy and not England, France or the United State the time it did in the early part of the 20th century. In other words, the dividing line between liberal democracy and fascism is very thin indeed; and this easily snaps when capitalism is acutely confronted with one of its numerous crises, heretofore listed. After all and historically speaking, Hitler's fascism transited from capitalism and, in all material respects, Germany attacked capitalist France and capitalist Britain as a capitalist state.

It may probably be the case that it is only when war is conceived in its physically violent form that the ideology of no war between liberal democracies can be meaningful to the uninformed. But then, a military war is not the only type of war that goes on between nations in the international system: there are the economic, diplomatic, cultural, and even health wars (e.g., AIDS) which afflict or can bring nations together in war-like posture and, if one may add for the sake of balanced argument, peace-like contacts, with serious repercussions, especially in the case of the former. In particular, economic wars go on intermittently between Japan and the U.S.A., on the one hand, and between Japan and the other liberal democracies over trade imbalances on the other hand. And this is the most concise feature of the phenomenon of imperialism, whether applied from the Marxist or the liberal point of view. As we would soon see, military wars fought for territorial aggrandizement are historically not fought for their own sake, but for strategic economic reasons, which include human resources.

More fundamentally, one would like to argue that where liberal democracies have had to fight a non-liberal democracy, it is not simply because

the U.S., Britain, France, and Germany lately (even in places mentioned in the quotation) love the people of those countries more than their leaders or aggressors love them. No! It is because of imperialist motives. Take the example of the concert of actions taken to 'liberate' Kuwait. What was liberated other than unrestricted access to the Gulf oil fields by America and her allies? The working peoples of Kuwait and Iraq - through whose sweats the oil is produced - are still supper-exploited by imperialism as much as they are autocratically ruled, respectively, by reactionary feudalistic and neo-Bonapartean leaders in Kuwait and Iraq. In a similar vein, why is the U.S.A., not showing the utmost human compassion to the Cuban people since it is agreed that they lack, among other things, consumer goods, which is the reason given for the emigration of some of the citizens of that country to the U.S.A., by providing some of these needs? Helping Cubans, when Castro is still there, in the manner we are suggesting, is assumed to be capable of bolstering a regime or a system of government the U.S.A. and all the other imperialist states would want to see crumble. It is simply not possible; and it is not logical to the system of imperialist super-exploitation and aggression.

Imperialism, in the strictest Marxian sense, therefore, does not or is not going to diminish because there is *now pax liberal democraciana* or that liberal democracy has triumphed over all other competing systems, such as the socialist state system. Indeed, the only new world order that has already emerged is the world capitalist order that would ride roughshod, as it has always done, over every nation that seeks to challenge its hegemony. Lenin is, therefore, correct to have dubbed imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism and that it is also a perniciously aggressive social system.

It is equally necessary to re-state Lenin's thought on imperialism in order to struggle against it and have it defeated, especially in the light of its contemporary atrocities and utter disregard for human dignities on a global scale. It is imperialism, more than anything else, that caused the collapse of the Soviet state system; it merely took the arrival of the renegades and unpatriotic elements like Gorbachev, Yeltsin, etc., to exercise or deliver the *coup de grace*. In addition, the ideological veil that paints imperialist/capitalist states as friendly and war-detesting, which suffuses Fukuyama's book, must be thoroughly exposed to enable victims to know who the real enemy is. The alleged benignity of the liberal democratic state in the domestic setting is a ruse that is indeed more than negated by its transgressive absurdities in the global setting.

Concluding Remarks

From the foregoing, one does not doubt the fact that Marxism and some of the practices based on it have not gone or are not going through crises. In one

respect, it may no longer be fashionable to insist on the one-party system in the transitional phase to communism, as this is certainly going” to give rise to sectarianism and opportunism of the type that destroyed the socialist state system in the former Soviet Union and the East European countries. But this is not to say that a revolutionary party - purely and simply dedicated to the cause and the world-view of the workers - should not be advocated for and championed.

Indeed, the basic point of this paper is the continued relevance of the Marxist thought with respect to historical development and the possibility of further cultural and existential improvement of mankind in the communist millennium. History, indeed, has not ended with the currently triumphant re-entry of liberal democracy into discussion and practice. This much Fukuyama has admitted; i.e., that possibilities for the further development of mankind are not yet ruled out (see also Hegel below). Therefore, the ideology contained in *The End of History and the Last Man* must be exposed for its rationalization of the capitalist mode of production that has brought and still is bringing untold hardship to mankind.

Finally, since ideological and bourgeois blinkers would not allow Fukuyama to fully appreciate the point, Hegel, long ago in his characteristic idealism, put this matter of historical changes to rest as:

an advance to something better, more perfect ...[O]nly in those changes which take place in the region of Spirit does anything new arise. This peculiarity in the world of mind has indicated in the case of man an altogether different destiny from that of merely natural objects - in which we find always one and the same stable character, to which all change revert; - namely, a *real* capacity for change, and for the better - an impulse of *perfectibility* ... The principle of Perfectibility indeed is almost as indefinite a term of mutability in general; it is without scope or goal, and has no standard by which to estimate the changes in question: the improved, more perfect, state of things towards which it professedly tends is altogether undetermined.²⁹ (Emphasis in the original).

Endnotes

1. Fukuyama, F., *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1992).
2. Marx, K. and F. Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party* in K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983, 5th printing), p. 108.
3. Marx, K., *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, 1st Manuscript.

4. Marx, K., *Capital*, Vol. 1. (London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd, 1983 repr.), p. 88
5. *Ibid*, p. 172.
6. *Ibid*.
7. *Ibid. pp. 170-1*
8. Onimode, B., *An Introduction to Marxist Political Economy* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1985), p. 93. The ratio of surplus value to wages is described as *the rate of surplus value* and the rate of surplus value is also described as *the rate of exploitation*. See J. Eaton, *Political Economy: A Marxist Textbook* (New York: International Publishers Co. Inc., 1981 edition), p. 75.
9. Fukuyama, *op.cit.*, p. 65.
10. *Ibid.*, p.66.
11. Kojeve, A., *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* (New York: Basic books, 1969; translated by J. Nichols. Quoted in Fukuyama, *ibid.*, p.67.
12. Fukuyama, *ibid.*, quoting a passage from K. Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies* (p. 227), p. 349.
13. Russell, B., *Unpopular Essays* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1951), p.22.
14. Among serious radical critique of the capitalist mode and its internationalist hegemonization, see C. Ake, *Social Science as Imperialism: The Theory of Political Development* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1979); S. Amin, 'Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: Origins and Contemporary Forms,' *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.10, No. 4 (1972); ————, *Neo-Colonialism in West Africa* (Harmonds worth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1973); P. Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York & London: Monthly Review, Inc., 1957); F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (Harmonds worth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1967 repr.); A.G. Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment," in C.K Wilber (ed.), *The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment* (New York: Random House, Inc., 1979, 2nd ed.), pp. 103-113; C. Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism, 1964-71* (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1978 repr.); B. Onimode, *Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria: The Dialectics of Mass Poverty* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1982); R. Owen and B. Sutcliffe (eds.), *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism* (London: Longman Publishers Ltd., 1972); T. Szentes. *The Political Economy of Underdevelopment* (Budapest: Akademiai Publications, 1983 repr.); and I. Wallerstein, 'Dependence in an Interdependent World: The Limited Possibilities of a Transformation Within the Capitalist World Economy,' *African Studies Review*, Vol.17, No.1 (1974), pp. 1-26.

15. As much as one can argue that nuclear weapons have served as deterrent arsenals and hence have diminished the numerical level of warfare in the period since the Second World War, it can be said that the absence of men and women who can easily be dragged and marooned like sheep into a global conflict is what has also prevented war on that scale before the collapse of the Cold War. Besides, a nuclear war is not a war, strictly speaking, where military geniuses can be created; rather, as a total war, it means Western civilization too is at risk of total extinction.
16. Rostow, W.W., *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971, 2nd edition).
17. The Marxist classicists who wrote on the origins of inequality and how to overcome it include, among others, K. Marx and F. Engels, *The Manifesto of the Communist Party*, *op.cit.*, and F. Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, in K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, vol.3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983, 5th printing), pp.191-334.
18. Fukuyama, *op.cit.*, pp.289-90.
19. *Ibid.*, p.290. ~20. *Ibid*, p.212.
21. *Ibid.*, pp.211-2.
22. *Ibid.*, pp.212-3.
23. Lenin, V.I., *Imperialism, the Highest State of Capitalism*, in V.I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. I (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977 repr.), pp.641-731.
24. *Ibid.*, p.700.
25. Fukuyama, *op.cit.*, p.260.
26. *Ibid.*, p.263.
27. *Ibid.*, pp.262-3.
28. This much he tried to do by criticizing Michael Doyle, especially in his arbitrary choice of date to delineate the period from which war has not occurred between and among liberal democratic states. See *ibid.*, p.263
29. Hegel, G.W.F., *The Philosophy of History* (New York: Dover Publications, inc., 1956), p.54.